stag hunt example international relations
Gardner's vision, the removal of inferior, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole. In this section, I briefly argue that state governments are likely to eventually control the development of AI (either through direct development or intense monitoring and regulation of state-friendly companies)[29], and that the current landscape suggests two states in particular China and the United States are most likely to reach development of an advanced AI system first. In so doing, they have maintained a kind of limited access order, drawing material and political benefits from cooperating with one another, most recently as part of the current National Unity Government. Despite this, there still might be cases where the expected benefits of pursuing AI development alone outweigh (in the perception of the actor) the potential harms that might arise. Let us call a stag hunt game where this condition is met a stag hunt dilemma. There are three levels - the man, the structure of the state and the international system. [17] Michele Bertoncello and Dominik Wee, Ten ways autonomous driving could redefine the automotive world, Mcikinsey&Company, June 2015, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/ten-ways-autonomous-driving-could-redefine-the-automotive-world (suggesting that driverless cars could reduce traffic fataltiies by up to 90 percent). Moreover, each actor is more confident in their own capability to develop a beneficial AI than their opponents. 'War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention'. In this example, each player has a dominantstrategy. Leanna Litsch, Kabul Security Force Public Affairs. It truly takes a village, to whom this paper is dedicated. Uneven distribution of AIs benefits couldexacerbate inequality, resulting in higher concentrations of wealth within and among nations. Deadlock is a common if little studied occurrence in international relations, although knowledge about how deadlocks are solved can be of practical and theoretical importance. In their paper, the authors suggest Both the game that underlies an arms race and the conditions under which it is conducted can dramatically affect the success of any strategy designed to end it[58]. On a separate piece of paper, write the best possible answer for each one. September 21, 2015 | category: They are the only body responsible for their own protection. Deadlock occurs when each actors greatest preference would be to defect while their opponent cooperates. In the US, the military and intelligence communities have a long-standing history of supporting transformative technological advancements such as nuclear weapons, aerospace technology, cyber technology and the Internet, and biotechnology. In short, the theory suggests the variables that affect the payoff structure of cooperating or defecting from an AI Coordination Regime that determine which model of coordination we see arise between the two actors (modeled after normal-form game setups). [38] Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, Formal Models of Arms Races, Journal of Peace Science 2, 1(1976): 7788. Other names for it or its variants include "assurance game", "coordination game", and "trust dilemma". The Nash equilibrium for each nation is to cheat, so it would be irrational to do otherwise. The ongoing U.S. presence in Afghanistan not only enables the increasingly capable Afghan National Security Forces to secure more of their homeland, but it also serves as a very important political signal. On the other hand, real life examples of poorly designed compensation structures that create organizational inefficiencies and hinder success are not uncommon. [42] Vally Koubi, Military Technology Races, International Organization 53, 3(1999): 537565. Within the arms race literature, scholars have distinguished between types of arms races depending on the nature of arming. This iterated structure creates an incentive to cooperate; cheating in the first round significantly reduces the likelihood that the other player will trust one enough to attempt to cooperate in the future. Photo Credit: NATO photo by Capt. Using game theory as a way of modelingstrategicallymotivated decisions has direct implications for understanding basic international relations issues. Read about me, or email me. Each model is differentiated primarily by the payoffs to cooperating or defecting for each international actor. 695 0 obj [16], On one hand, these developments outline a bright future. Any individual move to capture a rabbit will guarantee a small meal for the defector but ensure the loss of the bigger, shared bounty. Altogether, the considerations discussed are displayed in Table 6 as a payoff matrix. Scholars of civil war have argued, for example, that peacekeepers can preserve lasting cease-fires by enabling warring parties to cooperate with the knowledge that their security will be guaranteed by a third party. These are a few basic examples of modeling IR problems with game theory. 0000009614 00000 n It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. %%EOF In a case with a random group of people, most would choose not to trust strangers with their success. Actor As preference order: CC > DC > DD > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CC > CD > DD > DC. You note that the temptation to cheat creates tension between the two trading nations, but you could phrase this much more strongly: theoretically, both players SHOULD cheat. In Just War Theory, what is the doctrine of double effect? 0000003027 00000 n This is the third technology revolution., Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. It involves a group of . How does the Just War Tradition position itself in relation to both Realism and Pacifism? Although the development of AI at present has not yet led to a clear and convincing military arms race (although this has been suggested to be the case[43]), the elements of the arms race literature described above suggest that AIs broad and wide-encompassing capacity can lead actors to see AI development as a threatening technological shock worth responding to with reinforcements or augmentations in ones own security perhaps through bolstering ones own AI development program. The remainder of this subsection looks at numerical simulations that result in each of the four models and discusses potential real-world hypotheticals these simulations might reflect. If both sides cooperate in an AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows: The benefit that each actor can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the probability that each actor believes such a regime would achieve a beneficial AI expressed as P_(b|A) (AB)for Actor As belief and P_(b|B) (AB)for Actor B times each actors perceived benefit of AI expressed as bA and bB. Depending on which model is present, we can get a better sense of the likelihood of cooperation or defection, which can in turn inform research and policy agendas to address this. If all the hunters work together, they can kill the stag and all eat. Actor As preference order: DC > DD > CC > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > DD > CC > DC. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world., China, Russia, soon all countries w strong computer science. [6] Moreover, speculative accounts of competition and arms races have begun to increase in prominence[7], while state actors have begun to take steps that seem to support this assessment. [43] Edward Moore Geist, Its already too late to stop the AI arms race We must manage it instead, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, 5(2016): 318321. I also examine the main agenda of this paper: to better understand and begin outlining strategies to maximize coordination in AI development, despite relevant actors varying and uncertain preferences for coordination. Whereas the short-term impact of AI depends on who controls it, the long-term impact depends now whether it can be controlled at all.[26]. Several animal behaviors have been described as stag hunts. To what extent are today's so-called 'new wars' (Mary Kaldor) post Clausewitzean in nature? [37] Samuel P. Huntington, Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results, Public Policy 8 (1958): 4186. Payoff variables for simulated Deadlock, Table 10. [26] Stephen Hawking, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark, Frank Wilczek, Transcendence looks at the implications of artificial intelligence but are we taking AI seriously enough? The Indepndent, May 1, 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence-but-are-we-taking-9313474.html. 2020 Yale International Relations Association | New Haven, CT, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610026/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, Interview with YPG volunteer soldier Brace Belden, Shaping Saddam: How the Media Mythologized A Monster Honorable Mention, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Percent of benefits Actor A can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Percent of benefits Actor B can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Actor As perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Actor Bs perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Actor As perceived harm from developing a harmful AI, Actor Bs perceived harm from developing a harmful AI. The ultimate resolution of the war in Afghanistan will involve a complex set of interlocking bargains, and the presence of U.S. forces represents a key political instrument in those negotiations. The payoff matrix is displayed as Table 12. In recent times, more doctrinal exceptions to Article 2(4) such as anticipatory self defence (especially after the events of 9/11) and humanitarian intervention. [56] Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation., [57] This is additionally explored in Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.. This means that it remains in U.S. interests to stay in the hunt for now, because, if the game theorists are right, that may actually be the best path to bringing our troops home for good. [14] IBM, Deep Blue, Icons of Progress, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/deepblue/. It is not clear whether the errors were deliberate or accidental. Under which four circumstances does the new norm of the 'Responsibility to Protect' arise? In international relations terms, the states exist in anarchy. Moreover, the AI Coordination Regime is arranged such that Actor B is more likely to gain a higher distribution of AIs benefits. She dismisses Clausewitz with the argument that he saw war as "the use of military means to defeat another state" and that this approach to warfare is no longer applicable in today's conflicts. [21] Jackie Snow, Algorithms are making American inequality worse, MIT Technology Review, January 26, 2018, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610026/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/; The Boston Consulting Group & Sutton Trust, The State of Social mobility in the UK, July 2017, https://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BCGSocial-Mobility-report-full-version_WEB_FINAL-1.pdf. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 8. The stag is the reason the United States and its NATO allies grew concerned with Afghanistans internal political affairs in the first place, and they remain invested in preventing networks, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, from employing Afghan territory as a base. [8] If truly present, a racing dynamic[9] between these two actors is a cause for alarm and should inspire strategies to develop an AI Coordination Regime between these two actors. Game Theory 101: The Complete William Spaniel shows how to solve the Stag Hunt using pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In this book, you will make an introduction to realism, liberalism and economic structuralism as major traditions in the field, their historical evolution and some theories they have given birth . For the painting about stag hunting, see, In this symmetric case risk dominance occurs if (. Those who play it safe will choose Like the hunters in the woods, Afghanistans political elites have a great deal, at least theoretically, to gain from sticking together. [15] Sam Byford, AlphaGo beats Lee Se-dol again to take Google DeepMind Challenge series, The Verge, March 12, 2016, https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/12/11210650/alphago-deepmind-go-match-3-result. Payoff variables for simulated Stag Hunt, Table 14. Your application of the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game to international trade agreements raises a few very interesting and important questions for the application of game theory to real-life strategic situations. We can see through studying the Stag Hunt game theory that, even though we are selfish, we still are ironically aiming to for mutual benefit, and thus we tend to follow a such a social contract. What is the key claim of the 'Liberal Democratic Peace' thesis? If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to succeed. War is anarchic, and intervening actors can sometimes help to mitigate the chaos. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a game in Deadlock. The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. Finally, Jervis[40] also highlights the security dilemma where increases in an actors security can inherently lead to the decreased security of a rival state. Is human security a useful approach to security? Learn how and when to remove these template messages, Learn how and when to remove this template message, "Uses of Game Theory in International Relations", "On Adaptive Emergence of Trust Behavior in the Game of Stag Hunt", "Stag Hunt: Anti-Corruption Disclosures Concerning Natural Resources", https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Stag_hunt&oldid=1137589086, Articles that may contain original research from November 2018, All articles that may contain original research, Articles needing additional references from November 2018, All articles needing additional references, Wikipedia articles that are too technical from July 2018, Articles with multiple maintenance issues, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0, This page was last edited on 5 February 2023, at 12:51. The closestapproximationof this in International Relations are universal treaties, like the KyotoProtocolenvironmental treaty. [21] Moreover, racist algorithms[22] and lethal autonomous weapons systems[23] force us to grapple with difficult ethical questions as we apply AI to more society realms. Two hunters can either jointly hunt a stag (an adult deer and rather large meal) or individually hunt a rabbit (tasty, but substantially less filling). In this section, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. What is the so-called 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping? Downs et al. Understanding the Stag Hunt Game: How Deer Hunting Explains Why People are Socially Late. The best response correspondences are pictured here. The story is briefly told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality : If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would h ave gone off in pursuit . 0000003638 00000 n [48] Denise Garcia and Monica Herz, Preventive Action in World Politics, Global Policy 7, 3(2016): 370379. This is taken to be an important analogy for social cooperation. THE STAG HUNT THE STAG HUNT T HE Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. [54] In a bilateral AI development scenario, the distribution variable can be described as an actors likelihood of winning * percent of benefits gained by winner (this would be reflected in the terms of the Coordination Regime). If they are discovered, or do not cooperate, the stag will flee, and all will go hungry. To begin exploring this, I now look to the literature on arms control and coordination. In this article, we employ a class of symmetric, ordinal 2 2 games including the frequently studied Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt to model the stability of the social contract in the face of catastrophic changes in social relations. No payoffs (that satisfy the above conditions including risk dominance) can generate a mixed strategy equilibrium where Stag is played with a probability higher than one half. Additionally, both actors can expect a greater return if they both cooperate rather than both defect. Such a Coordination Regime could also exist in either a unilateral scenario where one team consisting of representatives from multiple states develops AI together or a multilateral scenario where multiple teams simultaneously develop AI on their own while agreeing to set standards and regulations (and potentially distributive arrangements) in advance. Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. A major terrorist attack launched from Afghanistan would represent a kind of equal opportunity disaster and should make a commitment to establishing and preserving a capable state of ultimate value to all involved. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. [49] For example, by defecting from an arms-reduction treaty to develop more weapons, an actor can gain the upper hand on an opponent who decides to uphold the treaty by covertly continuing or increasing arms production. In this section, I survey the relevant background of AI development and coordination by summarizing the literature on the expected benefits and harms from developing AI and what actors are relevant in an international safety context. A hurried U.S. exit will incentivize Afghanistans various competing factions more than ever before to defect in favor of short-term gains on the assumption that one of the lead hunters in the band has given up the fight. hTIOSQ>M2P22PQFAH Explain Rousseau's metaphor of the 'stag hunt'. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Chicken game. Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate Created Date: 20160809151831Z [7] E.g. Finally, a Stag Hunt occurs when the returns for both actors are higher if they cooperate than if either or both defect. Here if they all act together they can successfully reproduce, but success depends on the cooperation of many individual protozoa. What are, according to Kenneth Waltz, the causes of war? If they both work to drain it they will be successful, but if either fails to do his part the meadow will not be drained. As we discussed in class, the catch is that the players involved must all work together in order to successfully hunt the stag and reap the rewards once one person leaves the hunt for a hare, the stag hunt fails and those involved in it wind up with nothing. Table 9. 8,H7kcn1qepa0y|@. The area of international relations theory that is most characterized by overt metaphorical imagery is that of game theory.Although the imagery of game theory would suggest that the games were outgrowths of metaphorical thinking, the origins of game theory actually are to be found in the area of mathematics. }}F:,EdSr hunting stag is successful only if both hunters hunt stag, while each hunter can catch a less valuable hare on his own. For example, can the structure of distribution impact an actors perception of the game as cooperation or defection dominated (if so, should we focus strategic resources on developing accountability strategies that can effectively enforce distribution)?
